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CIVIL LITIGATION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Black Gold OilField Services, LLC v. City of Williston 
 
In Black Gold OilField Services, LLC v. City of Williston,1 Black Gold 
OilField Services, LLC (“Black Gold”) appealed from an order vacating a 
temporary restraining order and denying its request to preliminarily enjoin 
 
1.  2016 ND 30, 875 N.W.2d 515. 
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the City of Williston (“Williston”) and the Williston City Commission 
(“City Commission”) from enforcing a decision to close Black Gold’s 
temporary workforce housing facility during the pendency of Black Gold’s 
lawsuit against Williston and the City Commission.2 
Black Gold owned the Black Gold Williston Lodge, a temporary 
workforce housing facility commonly known as a man camp.3  The man 
camp housed Bakken oilfield workers and was located outside Williston 
city limits.4  The man camp began operating in March 2011, under a 
temporary use permit issued by Williams County.5  In February 2013, 
Williston annexed about 4888 acres of land in Williams County, including 
the land of the man camps.6  In September 2013, Williston adopted a 
resolution to extend permits issued by Williams County for workforce 
housing facilities, including the man cap in issue; however, the facilities 
had to comply with Williston’s zoning, building, and fire codes.7 
Black Gold received notification in December 2013 that it must install 
a fire protection sprinkler system.8  Although Black Gold requested a 180-
day extension, Williston granted Black Gold a one-year extension.9  In June 
2014, Willison again notified Black Gold that the man camp must install the 
sprinkler system by December 2014.10  In November 2014, Black Gold was 
in contact with the Williston Fire Department regarding the installation of 
the sprinkler system.11  The fire inspector informed Black Gold that the 
installation of the sprinklers would be finished in February 2015.12 
In January 2015, a meeting was held in which the City Commission 
considered issues about the fire sprinkler systems at these workforce 
housing facilities.13  The meeting minutes stated that Black Gold did not 
comply with the City Codes, that Black Gold was given adequate time to 
comply with the codes, and that Black Gold failed to meet the rules and 
regulations.14  The City Commission held a subsequent meeting in February 
 
2.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 1, 875 N.W.2d at 517. 
3.  Id. ¶ 2. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 4, 875 N.W.2d at 518. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. ¶ 5. 
14.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 5, 875 N.W.2d at 518-19. 
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2015,15 and by this time, the sprinkler system was installed and the facility 
passed the fire inspection.16  Ultimately, however, Williston informed Black 
Gold that all tenants were required to vacate the facility by May 1, 2015, 
and that the structure must be removed by September 2, 2015.17 
Subsequently, Black Gold filed a complaint against Williston and the 
City Commission for a declaratory judgment and to prohibit enforcement of 
the decision.18  Black Gold’s allegations were as follows: 
Commissioner Cymbaluk was a real estate agent and property 
manager in Williston and had a financial interest in closing Black 
Gold’s housing facility.  Black Gold alleged that Williston’s 
decision violated Black Gold’s state and federal constitutional 
rights to due process because the decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable; that Black Gold had insufficient 
time and opportunity to comply with fire and building codes after 
the annexation; that Black Gold was not provided notice and an 
opportunity to appear at the January 13, 2015 City Commission 
meeting; and that there was no basis for the decision not to extend 
the special use permit after the sprinklers were installed.  Black 
Gold also alleged the City Commission lacked jurisdiction because 
the Williston building officer has exclusive jurisdiction under 
Williston’s zoning ordinances to enforce Williston’s building and 
fire codes after appropriate notice and opportunity to correct 
violations.19 
Black Gold’s complaint sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and 
a writ of prohibition to prevent Williston from implementing its decision.20  
Additionally, Black Gold immediately sought a temporary restraining order 
to prevent Williston from closing the man camp pending the lawsuit.21  The 
district court initially granted the temporary restraining order; however, 
after Williston responded, the court vacated the temporary restraining order 
and denied Black Gold’s request for preliminary injunction of Williston’s 
decision.22  The district court found that Black Gold received adequate time 
to comply with Williston’s requirements, that Black Gold was afforded the 
 
15.  Id. ¶ 6, 875 N.W.2d at 519. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. ¶ 7. 
19.  Id. at 519-20. 
20.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 17, 875 N.W.2d at 523. 
21.  Id. ¶ 8, 875 N.W.2d at 520. 
22.  Id. 
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opportunity to present its arguments as to why it failed to comply, and that 
Williston acted within its authority.23  Black Gold appealed.24 
The North Dakota Supreme Court initially considered the district 
court’s order denying Black Gold’s request for preliminary injunction.25  
Section 28-27-02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides the statutory 
criteria for appealability.26  The order must have met one of the statutory 
criteria to prevent dismissal.27  If the order was appealable, it must have 
also complied with Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil 
Procedure.28  An order vacating or dissolving a temporary restraining order 
after notice and a hearing is an appealable order under §§ 28–27–02(3) and 
(7).29  In this case, however, there was no Rule 54(b) order.30  The Court 
stated that “[a]lthough we cannot consider this matter as an appeal because 
there is no Rule 54(b) certification, we conclude the issues in this case 
about Black Gold’s request for interim relief affect fundamental interests of 
the litigants.”31  The Court considered Black Gold’s appeal as a request to 
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and considered the issues raised by 
Black Gold on the merits.32 
A district court’s discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is 
based on the following factors: (1) substantial probability of succeeding on 
the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) harm to other interested parties; and 
(4) effect on public interest.33  Additionally, the Court stated “[a district 
court’s] determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion.”34  A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.35  Black Gold provided three 
arguments as to why it had a substantial probability of succeeding on the 
merits. 
First, Black Gold argued that it would succeed on the merits because 
Williston’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.36  Black 
 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. ¶ 9. 
26.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 9, 875 N.W.2d at 520 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 
28-27-02 (2016)). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. ¶ 10, 875 N.W.2d at 521. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 12, 875 N.W.2d at 521. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. ¶ 13. 
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Gold claimed that Williston had no rational reason to order the closure of 
the man camp because it had been in compliance since February 2015.37  
The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion because 
Black Gold’s argument did not challenge the validity of the enactment of 
any zoning ordinance, Williston had authority to consider the extension of 
the special use permit, Black Gold admitted it failed to perform an act the 
law required, and more importantly, it failed to demonstrate how an appeal 
to the district court was not an adequate legal remedy to resolve this 
claim.38  Black Gold’s second argument was that it had a substantial 
probability of succeeding on the merits because Williston’s decision 
violated Black Gold’s due process rights.39  It argued a due process 
violation on grounds that Commissioner Cymbaluk’s (“Cymbaluk”) 
participation in the decision established bias which resulted in an unfair 
decision.40 
The court looked to § 44-04-22, which provided a statutory standard 
for assessing potential disqualifications of city commissioners.41  The 
commissioner’s conduct must have been a direct and substantial personal or 
pecuniary interest.42  In support of the motion to vacate the temporary 
restraining order, Williston submitted an affidavit of Cymbaluk,43 the 
relevant parts of which stated: 
14. On January 13, 2015, the City Commission took action on 
Black Gold and ATCO workforce housing facilities extension of 
their temporary permit. 
15. The City Commission unanimously voted to NOT extend their 
permit due to their failures to comply with the requirements laid 
by the City and Resolution # 13–127, in particular their failure to 
install a fire sprinkler system on or before December 31, 2014. 
16.  On January 15, 2015, two days after the City Commission 
took action on Black Gold’s temporary housing permit extension, I 
was contacted by Chris, a representative of Calfrac Well Services, 
Corp., regarding the action the City took on January 13, 2015. 
 
37.  Id. 
38.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 17, 875 N.W.2d at 523. 
39.  Id. ¶ 18. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. ¶ 20 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-22 (2016)). 
42.  Id. ¶ 21, 875 N.W.2d at 524. 
43.  Id. ¶ 23. 
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17.  I was originally not available when the representative 
contacted me by phone, so I returned the phone call shortly after 
he left a message requesting I return his call. 
18.  When I spoke with Calfrac’s representative I relayed only the 
information that [was] already available to the public regarding the 
City Commission’s decision not to extend Black Gold’s temporary 
housing permit.  This information was not only public, as the 
January 13, 2015, City Commission meeting was open to the 
public, but the Williston Herald also published an article on the 
City Commission’s action regarding Black Gold’s facility on 
January 14, 2015. 
19.  Further, Black Gold has attempted to assert I have a financial 
incentive to contact Black Gold’s customers since I am a licensed 
real estate broker in Williston, North Dakota, as tenants of Black 
Gold would move into apartments or homes managed by Basin 
Brokers. 
20.  I have no interest, individually or otherwise, in any residential 
apartments. 
21.  As a shareholder of Basin Brokers, Inc., Basin Brokers does 
not and has not managed any residential apartments, or otherwise. 
22.  The only residential management Basin Brokers has 
undertaken and is undertaking is a single family condominium . . . 
and the reason why Basin Brokers agreed to undertake the 
management of this property is a real estate agent for Basin 
Brokers listed the property and it failed to sell by the fall of 2013.  
The owner of the property asked if Basin Brokers could lease it on 
her behalf as she did not want it to lie vacant during the winter and 
Basin Brokers agreed to do so.  The term of the lease is for 
November 1, 2013 until May 30, 2015.44 
Black Gold argued that Cymbaluk had a direct financial incentive to 
close the man camp.45  The Court found that these were conclusory 
assertions and that Black Gold did not offer evidence to rebut Cymbaluk or 
prove that Cymbaluk had any direct and substantial pecuniary or financial 
interest in closing the man camps.46  The Court also concluded that the 
 
44.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 23, 875 N.W.2d at 525-26. 
45.  Id. ¶ 24, 875 N.W.2d at 526. 
46.  Id. 
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district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction 
on this issue.47 
Finally, Black Gold argued that it had a substantial probability of 
succeeding on the merits because Williston’s decision violated zoning 
ordinances.48  Black Gold claimed that Williston acted beyond its authority 
because only the building office was authorized to enforce zoning 
ordinances.49  The Court reasoned that Black Gold’s argument was rejected 
because Williston’s actions were not enforcing an existing zoning 
ordinance; instead, Williston’s actions constituted a vote not to take further 
action to extend Black Gold’s permit.50  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a preliminary injunction on this issue.51  Hence, the 
Court held that Black Gold failed to establish a substantial probability of 
succeeding on the merits of its lawsuit against Williston and the City 
Commission.  Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and 






















47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. ¶ 25. 
50.  Black Gold OilField Services, LLC, ¶ 26, 875 N.W.2d at 526. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. ¶ 27. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
City of Grand Forks v. Gale 
 
In City of Grand Forks v. Gale,53 Jason Gale (“Gale”) appealed from a 
criminal judgment in which a jury found him guilty of driving under the 
influence.54  Gale argued that he was convicted and sentenced in violation 
of his state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial.55  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the criminal judgment, finding that Gale’s 
right to a speedy trial was violated.56 
Gale was cited for driving under the influence on April 20, 1995.57  His 
attorney, Henry Rowe, requested that Gale sign a “limited power of 
attorney.”58  The power of attorney authorized Howe to appear in court on 
Gale’s behalf.59  A sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 21, 1995.60 
The court mailed three notices of hearing requiring Gale to appear 
personally.61  Gale failed to appear at the sentencing hearing. As a result, an 
arrest warrant was issued.62  No subsequent action was taken until March 5, 
2015, when Gale filed a motion to recall the arrest warrant.63  
Consequently, the City of Grand Forks (“the City”) filed an amended 
information.64  Gale filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the City 
violated Gale’s right to a speedy trial.65  Gale argued that he was unaware 
of the pending case, that he was unaware of the active warrant, that his 
attorney told him the case was closed, and that all fines had been paid.66  
Gale asserted that the City did not prosecute his case for twenty years 
despite the fact that during that time, he had been in and out of court for 
unrelated legal matters.67 
 
53.  2016 ND 58, 876 N.W.2d 701. 
54.  Id. ¶ 1, 876 N.W.2d at 704. 
55.  Id. ¶ 4, 876 N.W.2d at 705. 
56.  Id. ¶ 23, 876 N.W.2d at 710. 
57.  Id. ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 704. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Gale, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 704. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. ¶ 3. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Gale, ¶ 3, 876 N.W.2d at 704. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. 
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A jury trial was held on July 7, 2015.68  The arresting officer was the 
only witness to testify.69  Due to the twenty-year delay, most of the officer’s 
testimony was based on the report he had written after the arrest.70  
Furthermore, no blood-alcohol test evidence was admitted and Gale was 
found guilty.71 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution guarantee criminal defendants 
the right to a speedy trial.72  The United States Supreme Court developed a 
four-factor test to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been 
violated: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the 
accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the 
accused.73 
The North Dakota Supreme Court first looked at the length of the 
delay, which must be long enough to be presumptively prejudicial.74  Here, 
the length of the delay was twenty years, which is clearly longer than the 
time required to try a DUI case.75  The prosecution even conceded to this 
factor,76 which resulted in this factor heavily weighing in favor of Gales.77 
 The North Dakota Supreme Court next looked to second factor, which 
is the reason for the delay.  “A defendant has no duty to bring himself to 
trial; the state has that duty. . . . However, if the defendant causes the delay, 
this factor weighs against him.”78  The City argued that Gale caused the 
delay because he received three notices which made him aware of the 
sentencing hearing.79  Gale asserted that he was unaware that he had to 
appear, as he signed a power of attorney authorizing his attorney to appear 
in court on his behalf.80  Further, Gale claimed that his attorney told him the 
case was closed.81  The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this factor 
weighed in favor of Gale because the City ceased prosecution after Gale 
failed to appear.82  “The prosecutor and the court have an affirmative 
 
68.  Id. ¶ 4. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 705. 
71.  Gale, ¶ 4, 876 N.W.2d at 705. 
72.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 12. 
73.  Gale, ¶ 5, 876 N.W.2d at 705 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972)). 
74.  Id. ¶ 9. 
75.  Id. ¶ 10, 876 N.W.2d at 706. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. ¶ 11. 
79.  Gale, ¶ 12, 876 N.W.2d at 706. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. ¶ 16, 876 N.W.2d at 708. 
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constitutional obligation to try the defendant in a timely manner, and this 
duty requires a good faith, diligent effort to bring him to trial quickly. . . . 
This factor ‘weighs against the State if the State is negligent by not 
diligently pursuing prosecution.’”83 
The third factor the North Dakota Supreme Court looked at was 
whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial.  A defendant’s 
knowledge of a pending case is important.84  The Court reasoned that 
because Gale was aware of the pending case, but did not assert his right to a 
speedy trial until twenty years later, this factor favored the City.85  Finally, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the last factor, which was 
prejudice to the defendant.  The United States Supreme Court has instructed 
courts to asses this factor in light of the following elements, which highlight 
what the right to a speedy trial was meant to do: (1) prevent oppressive 
pretrial incarceration; (2) minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and 
(3) limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.86  The first 
element, prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, was not applicable 
in this case, as Gale was not incarcerated prior to trial.87  The second factor, 
minimization of the accused’s anxiety and concern, was also insignificant 
because Gale asserted that he was unaware of the pending case while it was 
delayed.88  Gale did not claim he experienced any anxiety or concern until 
the charge was brought to light twenty years later.89 
The last factor, impairment of the accused’s defense, was relevant 
because Gale claimed his defense was significantly impaired.90  He asserted 
that his efforts to cross-examine the arresting officer, who was the only 
witness at trial, were hampered because the officer did not remember 
anything about the incident that was not included in the arrest report, which 
was prepared for the purpose of prosecuting Gale.91  Gale stated “[t]here 
can be no effective cross-examination of a witness who remembers little to 
nothing outside his report.”92  The City also argued that its case was 
prejudiced: it was unable to utilize blood-test results because of foundation 
issues, and thus, “was left to prosecute a case based on an officer who had 
 
83.  Id. (quoting State v. Moran, 2006 ND 62, ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d 915). 
84.  Id. ¶ 17. 
85.  Gale, ¶ 17, 876 N.W.2d at 708. 
86.  Id. ¶ 18, 876 N.W.2d at 708-09. 
87.  Id. at 709. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. ¶ 19. 
91.  Gale, ¶ 19, 876 N.W.2d at 709. 
92.  Id. 
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very little specific recollection of the event and was relying primarily on a 
report he had prepared twenty years earlier.”93  The City maintained that it 
was not negligent in its prosecution, and it argued that Gale was required to 
show actual prejudice—something it asserted Gale had not done.94  The 
Court found that the City failed to diligently pursue the case; therefore, the 
prosecution was negligent.95  The Court also concluded that Gale was 
entitled to a presumption of prejudice.96  Three of the four factors weighed 





















93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. ¶ 21, 876 N.W.2d at 709-10. 
96.  Id. ¶ 22, 876 N.W.2d at 710. 
97.  Gale, ¶ 23, 876 N.W.2d at 710. 
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CONVERSION AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFER—REMEDIES—
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
PHI Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C. 
 
PHI Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C., involved a 
secured creditor bringing action against a debtor’s law firm seeking to 
recover funds under theories of conversion and fraudulent transfer.98  The 
district court entered judgment in favor of the creditor, PHI Financial 
Services, Inc. (“PHI”).99  Johnston Law Office, P.C. (“Johnston”) appealed, 
and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded, holding that (1) the firm was not liable for allegedly fraudulent 
transfer of funds to debtor’s father; (2) the firm was entitled only to funds 
representing services performed for debtor; (3) creditor perfected its 
security interests in governmental agricultural payments; and (4) the firm 
was subject to prejudgment interest on wrongly-retained attorney fees on 
date that funds were placed in office business account.100 
In 2007, Thomas and Mari Grabanski and John and Dawn Keely 
formed the Grabanski Land Partnership (“GLP”) for the purpose of 
purchasing farmland in Texas.101  They later formed G & K Farms (“G & 
K”), a North Dakota general partnership, also for the purpose of purchasing 
Texas farmland.102  G & K was insured under the Supplemental Revenue 
Assistance Payments Program (“SURE”), which was administered by the 
United States Department of Agriculture.103 In 2007 and 2008, Choice 
Financial Group (“Choice”) made a series of loans to G & K, totaling more 
than $6.75 million.104  In the security agreements between G & K and 
Choice, G & K agreed to, among other things, grant Choice a security 
interest in government and insurance payments.105  In 2008, PHI loaned 
$6.6 million to G & K, and, in return, G & K granted security agreements to 
PHI, which included “. . .all state or federal farm program payments. . . .”106 
G & K suffered $2.5 million in losses during 2008, but continued to 
plant crops in 2009; therefore, the Keeley’s withdrew from G & K early 
 
98.  2016 ND 20, 874 N.W.2d 910. 
99.  Id. ¶ 6, 874 N.W.2d at 914. 
100.  Id. ¶ 1, 874 N.W.2d. at 912. 
101.  Id. ¶ 2. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 3, 874 N.W.2d at 912. 
105.  Id. at 913. 
106.  Id. ¶ 4. 
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that year.107  The Grabanskis then formed Texas Family Farms (“TXX”) to 
farm the property.108  The Grabanskis eventually defaulted on all loans 
provided to their farming business entities and retained representation from 
Johnston.109  Numerous lawsuits were filed against the Grabanskis and their 
various business entities, and in March 2011, PHI obtained a judgment of 
$7.5 million against the Grabanskis and G & K.110 
In October 2011, G & K received Supplemental Revenue Assistance 
Payments Program (“SURE”) payments of $328,168 from the federal 
government.111  Johnston advised the Grabanskis not to deposit the SURE 
payments into G & K’s North Dakota bank account to shield the deposit 
from the amounts owed to Choice or other potential North Dakota 
creditors.112  As such, the Grabanskis deposited the SURE amounts into a 
new bank account in Texas.113  The Grabanskis then transferred $170,400 
of the SURE payment from the Texas bank account to Johnston’s trust 
account through two transactions, for the purposes of paying attorney’s fees 
and to send money to Tom Grabanski’s father, to indemnify him for monies 
paid on behalf of G & K the previous year.114 
PHI brought action against Johnston, later adding Choice, seeking to 
recover $170,400 on theories of conversion and fraudulent transfer.115  The 
district court held that PHI’s security interest in the SURE payments held 
priority over Choice’s interest, and PHI was entitled to any money sent to 
Grabanski’s father from the SURE payments.116  The district court also 
found the Grabanski’s payment of $150,000 to Johnston for legal services 
was fraudulent, but allowed Johnston to retain reasonably equivalent value 
for services rendered of $35,000.117  A judgment awarding $167,203.24 
plus interest was entered in favor of PHI.118 
Questions regarding actual or constructive fraudulent transfer are 
questions of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.119  
 
107.  Id. ¶ 5. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
110.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 5, 874 N.W.2d at 913. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. at 914. 
115.  Id. ¶ 6. 
116.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 6, 874 N.W.2d at 914. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Farstveet v. Rudolph ex rel. Eileen Rudolph Estate, 2000 ND 189, ¶ 20, 630 N.W.2d 
24, 31. 
          
280 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 267 
Johnston argued the district court erred in voiding the $24,225.37 it 
transferred from its law office trust to Grabanski’s father.120  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court found that Johnston held the $24,225.37 for the sole 
purpose of fulfilling an instruction to make the funds available to someone 
else.121  The Court further found that district court erred as a matter of law 
in holding Johnston liable for the transfer of $24,225.37 to Grabanski’s 
father.122 
Johnston further argued the district court erred in voiding a “major 
portion” of the $145,774.63 payment for attorney fees and legal services 
after finding Johnston was a good-faith transferee which had provided 
reasonably equivalent value for the transfer under North Dakota Century 
Code § 13-02.1-08(1).123  The Supreme Court agreed the $35,000 the 
district court granted to Johnston constituted the reasonable value of work 
Johnston provided the Grabanskis.124 
In its cross-appeal, PHI argued the district court erred in finding 
Johnston provided any value to G & K because G & K was defunct before 
legal representation occurred.125  Whether reasonably equivalent value has 
been received in exchange for a transfer is a question of fact subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review.126  The Court found PHI did not 
provide evidence to establish that $35,000 was an unreasonable amount of 
attorney fees for Johnston’s work on behalf of Grabanski.127 
Johnston next argued that the district court erred in holding PHI was 
not barred by res judicata128 from pursuing Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 9 remedies to collect the funds after it had obtained a money 
judgment against the Grabanskis and G & K in federal court.129  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with Johnston for two reasons.  The first 
reason was that a creditor may obtain a money judgment on the debt owed 
and foreclose on collateral in one or more proceedings so long as there is no 
 
120.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 11, 874 N.W.2d. at 915. 
121.  Id. ¶ 17, 874 N.W.2d at 917. 
122.  Id. 
123.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-08(1) (2016) (“A transfer or obligation is not voidable 
under subdivision a of subsection 1 of section 13-02.1-04 against a person that took in good faith 
and for a reasonably equivalent value given the debtor or against any subsequent transferee or 
obligee”). 
124.  Id. ¶ 22, 874 N.W.2d at 918. 
125.  Id. ¶ 21. 
126.  See Four Season’s Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v. Linderkamp, 2013 ND 159, ¶ 20, 837 
N.W.2d 147. 
127.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 22, 874 N.W.2d. at 918. 
128.  Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An issue that has been 
definitively settled by judicial decision”). 
129.  PHI Financial Services, ¶ 24, 874 N.W.2d. at 917. 
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double recovery.130  The second reason was that Johnston failed to 
acknowledge that the SURE payment was received by G & K after 
judgment was entered in the federal court action, and that the causes of 
action were not split.131 
The North Dakota Supreme Court further concluded Johnston was 
incorrect in arguing that PHI failed to perfect its security interest in the 
SURE payments transferred to the law firm.132  The Court reasoned that 
Johnston’s argument that the crops or their proceeds needed to be properly 
perfected was incorrect; rather, the government payments should have been 
properly perfected, as they were.133 
Johnston next argued that the district court erred in calculating 
prejudgment interest beginning on the dates G & K transferred the funds to 
the law firm rather than the date PHI filed its complaint to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court.134  The Court ruled that the district court erred in awarding 
prejudgment interest from the dates the SURE funds were transferred from 
G & K to Johnston, and held that Johnston could only be liable for 
prejudgment interest from the date the funds, designated as attorney fees, 
were removed from the Johnston law office trust account and placed in the 
office business account.135 
Choice then argued the district court erred in ruling PHI’s security 
interest had priority over Choice’s security interest,136 because PHI did not 
perfect its security interest by filing a financing statement in the state of 
Texas listing its interest in the crops as “farm products.”137  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court found that the crops themselves, or their proceeds, 
were not the collateral at issue, and that the governmental SURE payments 
did not qualify as “farm products,” but rather as “contract rights, accounts 
or general intangibles.”138  Because PHI had filed its financing statement 
covering the SURE payments in North Dakota before Choice, the Court 
held PHI’s security interest had priority over Choice’s security interest, and 
the district court did not err in its ruling.139 
 
130.  See Prod. Credit Ass’n of Mandan v. Obrigewitch, 443 N.W.2d 923, 926 (N.D. 1989); 
see also N. D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-98(3) (2016) which states “[t]he rights under subsections 1 
and 2 are cumulative and may be exercised simultaneously.” 
131.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 26, 874 N.W.2d. at 919. 
132.  See id. ¶¶ 27-30, 874 N.W.2d. at 919-20. 
133.  Id. ¶ 30, 874 N.W.2d. at 920. 
134.  Id. ¶ 31. 
135.  Id. ¶ 33, 874 N.W.2d. at 920-21. 
136.  Id. ¶ 35, 874 N.W.2d at 921. 
137.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 36, 874 N.W.2d. at 921. 
138.  Id. ¶¶ 36-37. 
139.  Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 874 N.W.2d at 922. 
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Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority.140  He disagreed with 
the portion of the majority that exonerated Johnston for its role in the 
fraudulent transfer of $20,400 from G & K to Grabanski’s father.141  Justice 
Sandstrom noted that because Johnston placed the money in its trust 
account before transferring it to Grabanski’s father, the transaction 
constituted the type of fraudulent transfer that “is precisely the sort of 

























140.  Id. ¶ 45, 874 N.W.2d at 922-23 (Sandstrom, J. dissenting). 
141.  Id. 
142.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-08 (2016). 
143.  PHI Financial Services, Inc., ¶ 45, 874 N.W.2d at 923. 
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CRIMINAL LAW – CIVIL COMMITMENTS – SEXUALLY 
DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS 
County State’s Attorney v. Johnson (In re Johnson) 
 
In County State’s Attorney v. Johnson,144 Jeremy Johnson (“Johnson”) 
appealed a district court order continuing his commitment as a sexually 
dangerous individual.145  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s order after concluding that the district court’s findings were 
insufficient.146 
In 2012, the state committed Johnson to the state hospital as a sexually 
dangerous individual.147  The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld 
Johnson’s initial commitment in Interest of Johnson.148  When Johnson 
petitioned the district court for discharge, it continued his commitment, 
finding that he was a sexually dangerous individual.149  Johnson appealed 
and, upon hearing his case, the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded his 
case for further fact findings regarding whether he had serious difficulty 
controlling his behavior.150  On remand, the district court reviewed the 
record, made additional findings, and continued Johnson’s commitment.151  
Johnson filed a timely appeal.152 
The standard of review for civil commitment of sexually dangerous 
individuals, set forth in Johnson, required the North Dakota Supreme Court 
to affirm the district court’s order denying a discharge petition unless it was 
“induced by an erroneous view of the law” or the Court “is firmly 
convinced it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.”153  The 
Court also explained that it gave “great deference to the trial court’s 
credibility determinations of expert witnesses” because the trial court was 
“the best credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony. . . . “154 
To prove a committed individual remains a sexually dangerous 
individual, the state bears the burden to prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the three following statutory elements: 
 
144.  2016 ND 29, 876 N.W.2d 25. 
145.  Id. ¶ 1, 876 N.W.2d at 26. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. ¶ 2. 
148.  Id.; 2013 ND 146, 835 N.W.2d 806. 
149.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 26. 
150.  Id.; 2015 ND 71, 861 N.W.2d 484. 
151.  In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861 N.W.2d 484, 487. 
152.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 26. 
153.  In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶¶ 4-5, 861 N.W.2d 484, 486 (quoting Matter of Wolff, 
2011 ND 76, ¶ 5, 796 N.W.2d 644, 646). 
154.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 3, 876 N.W.2d at 27. 
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(1) the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct, (2) 
the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is 
manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other 
mental disorder or dysfunction, and (3) the individual’s condition 
makes them likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory 
conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health 
or safety of others.155 
Additionally, in order to satisfy substantive due process, the state must 
prove that “the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his 
behavior.”156 
According to the Court, as a matter of law, the district court errs when 
its findings are insufficient or do not support its legal conclusions.157  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court deferred to a district court’s determination 
that an individual has serious difficulty controlling behavior when it is 
supported by specific findings demonstrating that difficulty.158 
The Court listed several of its previous findings, which constituted 
serious difficulty controlling behavior, such as when an individual: (1) 
frequently assaulted staff and his peers,159 (2) yelled profanities, (3) had an 
explosive temper, (4) refused to attend treatment, (5) acted in a sexual 
manner with a peer,160 (6) engaged in a sexual relationship with a peer, (7) 
stated he would take advantage of a minor if he knew he would not get 
caught, (8) would use drugs if they were offered to him, or (9) would 
provide oral sex if someone came to his door and wanted it.161 
The Court clarified that it will find error if the district court cannot 
support its determination that an individual had difficulty controlling his 
behavior with specific factual findings.162  As support, the Court cited 
 
155.  Id. (quoting In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 5, 861 N.W.2d 484, 486). 
156.  Id. (citing Matter of Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 7, 796 N.W.2d 644, 647). The Court 
continues: 
We construe the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to mean that proof of a 
nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness encompasses proof that the 
disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a 
dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the 
dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case. 
See also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
157.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 4, 876 N.W.2d at 27 (citing In re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶ 
8, 756 N.W.2d 771, 773). 
158.  Id. ¶ 5, 876 N.W.2d at 28. 
159.  Id. (citing In re G.L.D., 2011 ND 52, ¶ 7, 795 N.W.2d 346, 349-50). 
160.  Id. (citing Wolff ¶ 9, 796 N.W.2d 648). 
161.  Id. (citing In re M.D., 2012 ND 261, ¶ 10, 825 N.W.2d 838, 842). 
162.  Id. ¶ 6. 
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Midgett163 and Johnson’s 2015 appeal.164  In 2015, the Court found error 
when the district court “merely analyzed Johnson’s criminal history but ‘did 
not specifically state the facts upon which it relied, nor did it make specific 
findings on whether Johnson has serious difficulty in controlling his 
behavior.’”165 
Johnson asserted that the district court erred when it failed, yet again, 
to make sufficient findings that he had serious difficulty controlling his 
behavior.166  The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Johnson.167  
The State insisted the district court’s finding that Johnson’s inadequate 
progression in treatment was sufficient to show Johnson had serious 
difficulty controlling his behavior.168  While the North Dakota Supreme 
Court agreed that subpar progress in treatment “may indicate serious 
difficulty controlling behavior,” it “decline[d] to infer that one equals the 
other.”169 
The Court reasoned that “lack of progress in treatment alone is 
insufficient to meet this requirement for commitment.”170  The Court 
decided that the State had not met its statutory or constitutional burden 
because “the district court made no findings relating to Johnson’s present 
inability to control his behavior.”171  As a result, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court found an error of law because, on remand for the specific purpose, 
the district court still did not find Johnson had serious difficulty controlling 
his behavior, yet it continued his commitment.172  Therefore, the Court 
reversed the district court’s order and directed Johnson be released from 
civil commitment.173 
Justice Dale V. Sandstrom dissented because “[he] would have 
affirmed on the last appeal” and would again “affirm here.”174 
 
163.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 6, 876 N.W.2d at 28 (citing In re Midgett, 2009 ND 106, 
¶ 9, 766 N.W.2d 717, 720: “[t]he district court did not specifically state the facts upon which it 
relied or even make a finding on whether Midgett had serious difficulty in controlling his 
behavior.”). 
164.  In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861 N.W.2d 484, 487. 
165.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 6, 876 N.W.2d at 28 (quoting In re Johnson, 2015 ND 
71, 861 N.W.2d 484). 
166.  Id. ¶ 7. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. ¶ 8, 876 N.W.2d at 28 (emphasis in original). 
171.  In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 11, 876 N.W.2d at 29 (emphasis in original). 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. ¶ 12. 
174.  Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
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CRIMINAL LAW—CONSITUTIONAL LAW—SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES 
State v. Ballard 
 
In State v. Ballard,175 defendant Jeremy Ballard (“Ballard”) entered a 
conditional guilty plea in district court for possession of methamphetamine 
and possession of drug paraphernalia, following denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges against him.176  Ballard 
argued the district court should have suppressed the evidence against him 
because it resulted from a probationary search of his home without 
suspicion and in violation of his constitutional rights.177  In a divided 
opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the suspicionless search of 
an unsupervised probationer’s home was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.178 
In October 2013, Ballard pleaded guilty to several misdemeanor drug 
crimes, and among other minor punishments, was sentenced to two years of 
unsupervised probation.179  Relevant conditions of Ballard’s probation 
included that he “submit to a search of his person, place and vehicle at the 
request of law enforcement without a warrant” and that he “submit to 
random drug-testing without a warrant or probable cause, including but not 
limited to, urine analysis.”180  In March 2014, a Divide County deputy 
sheriff saw Ballard driving a car with two passengers.181  The deputy was 
aware Ballard and one of his passengers were on unsupervised probation 
and were subject to searches and random drug tests, and stopped Ballard’s 
car.182  The deputy testified that he stopped Ballard for the sole reason of 
performing a probation search and that he did not have any “reasonable 
articulabl[e] suspicion” of any drug-related or criminal activity when he 
made the stop.183  When the deputy activated his emergency lights, Ballard 
pulled over in front of his residence, and the deputy asked Ballard to exit 
the vehicle so he could perform a pat-down and search of Ballard’s 
vehicle.184  Ballard agreed; yet, neither yielded contraband.185 
 
175.  2016 ND 8, 874 N.W.2d 61. 
176.  Ballard, ¶¶ 1, 4, 874 N.W.2d at 62. 
177.  Id. ¶ 4. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. ¶ 2. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Ballard, ¶ 3, 874 N.W.2d at 62. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 62-63. 
184.  Id. at 63. 
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The deputy then entered Ballard’s residence without consent or a 
warrant.186  The deputy searched Ballard’s bedroom and found 
methamphetamine paraphernalia and a bag of crystal methamphetamine.187  
He then arrested Ballard, who was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia, both class C felonies.188  
At his hearing, Ballard’s motion to suppress the evidence found in his 
bedroom was denied, and he entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the 
right to appeal the denial to suppress the evidence.189 
Questions of law are fully reviewable.190  “Whether a violation of the 
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has 
occurred is a question of law.”191  When reviewing the constitutionality of 
probationary searches, the North Dakota Constitution provides the same 
protections as the United States Constitution:192 the unsupervised 
probationer’s liberty interests and expectation of privacy must be weighed 
against the state’s interest in protecting its citizens.193 
Prior to its analysis of the case, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
outlined the case law history regarding the legality of suspicionless, 
warrantless searches of probationers, which has recently and significantly 
developed in both North Dakota and the United States.  In 1972, in State v. 
Schlosser,194 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that evidence obtained 
during a warrantless probationary search of a supervised probationer was 
allowable.195  The probationer’s terms were similar to Ballard’s in that he 
agreed to be searched without a warrant.196  The Court reasoned the 
defendant’s status as a probationer affected his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment such that he had a lesser expectation of liberty and privacy 
than a non-criminal citizen, and the state had an interest in facilitating his 
rehabilitation and guarding the public.197  The Schlosser Court further 
weighed the reasonableness of the search in question with the criminality of 
 
185.  Id. 
186.  Id. ¶ 4. 
187.  Ballard, ¶ 4, 874 N.W.2d at 63. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. ¶ 5. 
190.  Id. ¶ 6 (citing State v. Adams, 2010 ND 184, ¶ 7, 788 N.W.2d 619, 622). 
191.  Id. at 63-64 (citing State v. Maurstad, 2002 ND 121, ¶ 11, 647 N.W.2d 688, 691). 
192.  Id. ¶ 8, 874 N.W.2d at 64. 
193.  Ballard, ¶ 9, 874 N.W.2d at 64. 
194.  202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1972). 
195.  Ballard, ¶ 11, 874 N.W.2d at 64. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 65. 
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the defendant’s conduct.198  Then, in State v. Perbix,199 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court expanded its decision in Schlosser by holding warrantless 
probation searches were valid under the Fourth Amendment if the searches: 
(1) contributed to rehabilitation; (2) were not used as subterfuge for 
criminal investigations; and (3) were performed in a reasonable manner.200 
In 2001, in United States v. Knights,201 the United States Supreme 
Court held a deputy’s warrantless search of a probationer’s home was 
constitutional when based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.202  
Shortly after, in State v. Maurstad,203 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
stated it would no longer analyze the alleged purpose of a probationary 
search to determine its validity, nor would it consider whether the search 
was conducted as a subterfuge for a criminal investigation; rather the Court 
would view the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search.204  
Then, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. 
California205 expanded on the idea that there exists a spectrum of 
expectation of liberty and privacy regarding warrantless searches, such that 
probationers expect more privacy than parolees and parolees expect more 
privacy than prisoners.206  The Court ultimately concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 
suspicionless search of a parolee.207 
Most recently, in State v. Gonzalez,208 a supervised probationer 
challenged the search of his cellphone.209  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that under the totality of circumstances, when a warrantless 
search is authorized by a condition of probation and is supported by 
reasonable suspicion, it is valid and reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.210 
Ballard was a case of first impression in North Dakota.  Despite 
rigorous examination of previous case law regarding suspicionless searches 
of parolees and probationers, the North Dakota Supreme Court never had 
 
198.  Id. 
199.  331 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1983). 
200.  Ballard, ¶ 14, 874 N.W.2d at 65. 
201.  534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
202.  Ballard, ¶ 22, 874 N.W.2d at 67-68. 
203.  2002 ND 121, 647 N.W.2d 688. 
204.  Ballard, ¶ 23, 874 N.W.2d at 68. 
205.  547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). 
206.  Ballard, ¶ 26, 874 N.W.2d at 69. 
207.  Id. ¶ 33, 874 N.W.2d at 70. 
208.  2015 ND 106, ¶ 1, 862 N.W.2d 535, 538. 
209.  Ballard, ¶ 27, 874 N.W.2d at 69. 
210.  Id. 
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the opportunity to take into account state cases which analyzed the 
constitutionality of a suspicionless search agreed upon as a term of 
probation for an unsupervised probationer as the sole basis for a search 
producing evidence of criminal conduct.  While acknowledging Ballard’s 
status as an unsupervised probationer is a form of criminal sanction211 
which reasonably denies him some degree of liberty, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court recognized that penalties imposed on an unsupervised 
probationer, the least egregious category of American criminals, should 
restrict the smallest degree of such individual’s liberties compared with 
more egregious classes of criminals.212  The Court noted the stark contrast 
of the relatively light conditions of probation bestowed upon Ballard 
compared to the loss of liberty, required drug testing, and limited travel 
restraints placed upon the parolee in Samson and the supervised probationer 
in Knights.213  As such, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the degree of 
freedom imposed by Ballard’s parole conditions outweighed the 
governmental interest in his restriction in this case, and found the 
suspicionless search of his home unconstitutionally unreasonable.214  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order to deny 
Ballard’s motion to suppress evidence and remanded to allow Ballard to 
withdraw his guilty plea.215 
Justice McEvers concurred with the majority, and wrote separately, 
stating the governmental interest in restricting a criminal on supervised 
probation is less than that of an unsupervised probationer, and that 
distinction should weigh into the reasonableness of a suspicionless 
search.216  Justice McEvers further noted that when the search of Ballard’s 
person and vehicle did not yield contraband, the deputy’s suspicion should 
have dissipated and he should not have searched Ballard’s home, making 
the search constitutionally unreasonable.217 
Justice Sandstrom dissented, and argued the majority erroneously 
concluded that the United States Constitution requires reasonable suspicion 
for probation searches.218  He further stated that even if reasonable 
suspicion was the proper standard, it was a question of law that should have 
 
211.  Id. ¶ 35, 874 N.W.2d at 70-71. 
212.  Id. ¶¶ 36-37. 
213.  See id. ¶¶ 38-40, 874 N.W.2d at 71-72. 
214.  Id. ¶ 41, 874 N.W.2d at 72. 
215.  Ballard, ¶ 42, 874 N.W.2d at 72. 
216.  Id. ¶¶ 43-44 (McEvers, J., concurring). 
217.  Id. ¶ 47, 874 N.W.2d at 73. 
218.  Id. ¶¶ 49-50 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
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been reviewed de novo.219  Justice Sandstrom would have affirmed the 
district court’s decision based upon the reasonable suspicion he believed 
was created by Ballard’s drug-related criminal history and his travel with 
another individual on probation for drug-related convictions.220 
Justice Sandstrom noted the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
previously held that a search “. . . did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because ‘reasonable suspicion’ is not required for a probationary search as 
long as the search is reasonable.”221  He acknowledged the United States 
Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the Fourth 
Amendment authorizes searching an individual simply because she is on 
probation, but stated the holding in Samson authorized such a search on a 
parolee solely for her condition of being on parole.222  He also stated the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been reluctant to decide whether the 
constitutionality of a warrantless probationary search requires 
individualized suspicion.223  Justice Sandstrom also noted the significant 
variance among the states regarding the constitutional parameters of 
suspicionless probationary searches.224  Justice Sandstrom believes the 
North Dakota Supreme Court has set rather concrete limits on an issue not 
yet substantially decided by higher courts’ jurisprudence by explicitly 
holding that a suspicionless, warrantless search of an unsupervised 
probationer is prima facie unconstitutional.225 
Justice Sandstrom, agreed with the majority that the constitutional 
bounds of warrantless searches on probationers are predicated on weighing 
the probationer’s freedom of privacy with the state’s interests to reduce 
recidivism and protect its citizens.226  He noted, however, that the purpose 
of suspicionless searches is to deter probationers from the commission of 
crime and to aid them in rehabilitation.227  Justice Sandstrom argued that the 
benefits of deterrence and rehabilitation are diminished in the majority’s 
holding, because probationers will know they cannot be searched without 
reasonable suspicion and will be able to conceal their crimes, especially 
drug-related crimes, in the privacy of their homes or at times they know 
 
219.  Id. ¶ 51, 874 N.W.2d at 73-74. 
220.  Id. at 74. 
221.  State v. Smith, 1999 ND 9, ¶ 9, 589 N.W.2d 546. 
222.  Ballard, ¶ 58, 874 N.W.2d at 75. 
223.  Id. ¶ 61, 874 N.W.2d at 77. 
224.  Id. ¶ 60, 874 N.W.2d at 76. 
225.  See id. ¶¶ 54-61, 874 N.W.2d at 74-78. 
226.  Id. ¶ 62, 874 N.W.2d at 78. 
227.  Id. ¶ 64, 874 N.W.2d at 79. 
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will be undisturbed by probation or law enforcement officers.228  Since 
Ballard was at a higher risk of recidivism, he argued that “. . . it is 
reasonable to conclude the exercise of the search clause contributed to the 
rehabilitation process regardless of whether Ballard’s probation was 
deemed supervised or unsupervised.”229 
Continuing his analysis of the circumstances surrounding Ballard, 
Justice Sandstrom noted there was nothing in the record to indicate the 
search was conducted for an improper amount of time or that any property 
was damaged during the search.230  Further, the search immediately 
followed the deputy stopping Ballard’s vehicle, was confined to the 
bedroom Ballard identified as his own, and was not conducted in a 
harassing manner.231  Justice Sandstrom concluded that the search in 
Ballard was reasonable and properly conducted.232  He viewed the degree 
of personal liberty Ballard lost due to his probationary status more severely 
than the majority. 
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a brief dissent agreeing with the 
majority of Justice Sandstrom’s opinion.233  The Chief Justice also noted 
that the conditions of Ballard’s probation, as written, were vague and 

















228.  Ballard, ¶ 64, 874 N.W.2d at 79. 
229.  Id. ¶ 69, 874 N.W.2d at 81. 
230.  Id. ¶ 70. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. ¶ 75, 874 N.W.2d at 83. 
233.  Id. ¶¶ 80-81, 874 N.W.2d at 84-85 (Vande Walle, C. J., dissenting). 
234.  Ballard, ¶ 81, N.W.2d at 84. 
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CRIMINAL LAW – STATUTES – PROPER ADVISORY 
State v. O’Connor 
 
In State v. O’Connor,235 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s suppression order because, after arresting Blaise O’Connor 
(“O’Connor”) for driving under the influence of alcohol, the law 
enforcement officer failed to inform him of the complete implied consent 
advisory before administering the Intoxilyzer test.236 
On May 24, 2015, a highway patrol officer stopped O’Connor for a 
defective taillight, 237 and suspected him of driving under the influence due 
to his slurred speech and bloodshot and watery eyes.238  O’Connor admitted 
to consuming alcohol.239  The officer requested O’Connor to perform field 
sobriety tests, allegedly recited a complete implied consent advisory, and 
asked O’Connor if he would submit to an onsite screening test.240 
The State claimed the officer read the complete implied consent 
advisory, which O’Connor contested.241  The implied consent advisory 
articulated in North Dakota Century Code § 39-20-14(3) related to 
screening tests and included the warning that “refusal to take the screening 
test is a crime.”242  Ultimately, O’Connor surrendered to the onsite 
screening test, which showed a blood alcohol level over the presumptive 
limit.243 
The officer arrested O’Connor and drove him to the Cass County 
jail,244 where the officer asked if O’Connor remembered the implied 
consent advisory previously read to him.245  O’Connor answered, “yeah, I 
think so.”246  It was uncontested that the officer provided an incomplete 
implied consent advisory to O’Connor before he submitted to the 
Intoxilyzer test.247  Specifically, the officer failed to advise O’Connor that 
 
235.  2016 ND 72, 877 N.W.2d 312. 
236.  Id. ¶ 1, 877 N.W.2d at 313. 
237.  Id. ¶ 2. 
238.  Id. 
239.  Id. 
240.  Id. 
241.  O’Connor, ¶ 2, 877 N.W.2d at 313. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Id. 
244.  Id. ¶ 3. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. 
247.  O’Connor, ¶ 3, 877 N.W.2d at 313. 
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“refusal to take a chemical test ‘is a crime punishable in the same manner as 
driving under the influence.’”248 
Because the officer failed to provide a complete implied consent 
advisory after O’Connor was arrested and before he submitted to a chemical 
test, O’Connor moved to suppress the result of the Intoxilyzer test.249  The 
district court granted O’Connor’s motion to suppress, determining, “A plain 
language reading of the statutes does not allow the implied consent advisory 
for screening tests under § 39-20-14 to be a substitute for the implied 
consent advisory for chemical tests under § 39-20-01.”250  The court found 
that the officer failed to give O’Connor a complete and proper advisory 
after arrest and before submission to the chemical test.251  Therefore, the 
court decided that “pursuant to § 39-20-01(3)(b), [O’Connor’s] Intoxilyzer 
chemical test [was] not admissible and must be excluded from the[] 
proceedings.”252 
The State argued that the district court erred in granting O’Connor’s 
motion to suppress.253  The North Dakota Supreme Court articulated its 
well established254 standard of review for motions to suppress evidence.255  
The implied consent requirements for the motor vehicle drivers in general 
are set forth in N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01.256  Over one month before 
O’Connor’s arrest, on April 15, 2015, the North Dakota Legislature passed 
an emergency amendment to N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01(3) to add 
subdivision b.257  The district court reasoned, using a plain meaning 
 
248.  Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01(3)(a) (2016)). 
249.  Id. ¶ 4. 
250.  Id. at 313-14. 
251.  Id. at 314. 
252.  Id. 
253.  O’Connor, ¶ 5, 877 N.W.2d at 314. 
254.  State v. Boehm, 2014 ND 154, ¶ 8, 849 N.W.2d 239, 244. 
255.  O’Connor, ¶ 6, 877 N.W.2d at 314 (citing State v. Whitman, 2013 ND 183, ¶ 20, 838 
N.W.2d 401, 406-07), stating: 
A trial court’s findings of fact in preliminary proceedings of a criminal case will not 
be reversed if, after the conflicts in testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there 
is a sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court’s 
findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  We 
do not conduct a de novo review.  We evaluate the evidence presented to see, based on 
the standard of review, if it supports the findings of fact. 
256.  Id. ¶ 7 (citing State v. Bauer, 2015 ND 132, ¶ 7, 863 N.W.2d 534, 536). 
257.  Id.; see 2015 N.D. SESS. LAWS CH. 268 § 9; currently, and at the time of O’Connor’s 
arrest, N.D. CENT. CODE. § 39-20-01(3) (2016) provides: 
The law enforcement officer shall inform the individual charged that North Dakota 
law requires the individual to take the test to determine whether the individual is under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs; that refusal to take the test directed by the law 
enforcement officer is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the 
influence; and that refusal of the individual to submit to the test directed by the law 
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analysis,258 that since O’Connor was the “individual charged” and it was 
uncontested the officer failed to provide a complete implied consent 
advisory259 before administering the Intoxilyzer chemical test, the results of 
said test were inadmissible in O’Connor’s driving under the influence 
proceeding.260 
The State presented two arguments intended to circumvent the plain 
language of the statute.261  First, the State argued under State v. Salter,262 
that the district court erred when it failed to substitute the officer’s onsite 
screening advisory for an incomplete advisory given after O’Connor’s 
arrest and before administration of the chemical test.263  The Supreme Court 
disagreed, asserting that to the extent the State’s rationale under Salter 
applied, “it ha[d] been abrogated by the plain language of the 2015 
amendment to N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(3).”264 
Second, the State argued that voluntary consent was an independent 
ground for admission of O’Connor’s chemical test, and relied on three 
previous North Dakota Supreme Court cases.265  These cases held that “the 
[N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 provisions] do not apply if a person 
voluntarily submits to a chemical test under Fourth Amendment consent 
principles.”266  The Supreme Court also disagreed with this argument, for 
the same reason¾“the voluntary consent holdings in Fossum, Hoffner[,] 
and Abrahamson have been abrogated by the plain language of the amended 
statute as well.”267 
 
enforcement officer may result in a revocation for a minimum of one hundred eighty 
days and up to three years of the individual’s driving privileges. 
A test administered under this section is not admissible in any criminal or 
administrative proceeding to determine a violation of section 39-08-01 or this chapter 
if the law enforcement officer fails to inform the individual charged as required under 
subdivision a. 
258.  O’Connor, ¶ 8, 877 N.W.2d at 314-15 (citing State v. Rufus, 2015 ¶ 15, 868 N.W.2d 
534, 540) (“[W]ords of a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood 
meaning unless a contrary intention plainly appears”). 
259.  Id.  Specifically, the officer failed to advise O’Connor before administering the test that 
refusal to submit to the chemical test is a crime that could result in the same punishment as driving 
under the influence. 
260.  Id. 
261.  Id. ¶ 9, 877 N.W.2d at 315. 
262.  2008 ND 230, 758 N.W.2d 702. 
263.  O’Connor, ¶¶ 9-11, 877 N.W.2d at 315-16. 
264.  Id. ¶ 11, 877 N.W.2d at 315. 
265.  Id. ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d at 316.  The State cited the following three cases: Fossum v. N.D. 
Dept. of Transp., 2014 ND 47, 843 N.W.2d 282; City of Bismarck v. Hoffner, 379 N.W.2d 282 
(N.D. 1985); and State v. Abrahamson, 328 N.W.2d 213 (N.D. 1982). 
266.  O’Connor, ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d at 316 (emphasis added). 
267.  Id. 
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Finally, the Court dispelled the parties’ contentions regarding the 
impact of the legislative history of 2015 for § 30-20-01(3)(b) reasoning that 
“the Legislature has clearly and unambiguously spoken . . . [it] has directed 
that a specific warning be provided to an arrested defendant before the 
results of a chemical test can be admitted in a criminal or administrative 
proceeding.”268  The Court reiterated further by stating that it offered 
“special deference to the Legislature” and that “adopting the State’s 
arguments here would eviscerate the 2015 amendment to [ N.D. Cent. 
Code] § 39-20-01(3).”269 
After rejecting both of the State’s arguments and explaining its 
deference to the Legislature, the Supreme Court found that the officer did 
not provide O’Connor a complete chemical test implied consent advisory 
after his arrest and before submission to the Intoxilyzer test.270  Therefore, 
finding it did not err, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s suppression order.271 
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, agreeing that the 
Legislature had established a bright line and the statutes left no room for the 
Court to engage in a legislative intent determination or whether a person 


















268.  Id. ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d at 316-17. 
269.  Id. ¶¶ 13-14. 
270.  Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 877 N.W.2d at 317. 
271.  Id. 
272.  O’Connor, ¶¶ 18-19 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring). 
          
296 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 267 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – STATUTORY RIGHTS OF ACTION – 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co. 
 
In Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co.,273 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice the mineral 
interest owner’s action against the oil company for damages for failure to 
pay royalties on flared gas.274  Vogel, the mineral interest owner, alleged 
Marathon Oil Company flared gas produced from the well and that some of 
the gas flared was in violation of North Dakota Century Code § 38–08–
06.4.275 
Section 38-08-06.4 restricted the flaring of gas produced with crude oil 
from an oil well.276  The statute provided for royalty payments to the 
mineral owners if an oil well was operated in violation of the specified 
restrictions.277  It also authorized the industrial commission to enforce the 
section and to determine the amount of royalty payments to be paid.278 
Vogel argued that her claims under § 38-08-06.4 should not have been 
dismissed because there was an implied private right of action for damages 
under the statute.279  The Court disagreed.280  In concluding that there was 
not an implied private right of action for damages under the statute, the 
Court noted three factors to be used in determining whether a private right 
of action should be implied under a statute: 
(1) [W]hether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special 
benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication 
of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such 
remedy or to deny one; and (3) whether it is consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiff.281 
As to the first factor, the Court concluded that Vogel “appear[ed] to be 
a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.”282  But the 
 
273.  2016 ND 104, 879 N.W.2d 471. 
274.  Id. ¶ 1, 879 N.W.2d at 474. 
275.  Id. ¶ 3, 879 N.W.2d at 474-75. 
276.  Id. ¶ 10, 879 N.W.2d at 476 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.4 (2016)). 
277.  Id. 
278.  Vogel, ¶ 10, 879 N.W.2d at 476. 
279.  Id. ¶ 9. 
280.  Id. ¶ 21, 879 N.W.2d at 479. 
281.  Id. ¶ 12, 879 N.W.2d at 476 (citing Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong, 2012 ND 119, 817 
N.W.2d 381). 
282.  Id. ¶ 13, 879 N.W.2d at 477. 
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“ultimate issue,” according to the Court, was the second factor¾ whether 
the legislature intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create a remedy.283  The 
statute’s plain language did not indicate any legislative intent to provide a 
private right of action,284 but the comprehensive regulatory scheme within 
the statute, the Court said, was strongly indicative that the legislature did 
not intent to provide any other remedies.285  Because Vogel failed to 
establish that the legislature intended to create a private right of action for 
damages, the Court decided that it “need not address the third factor.”286  
Thus, the Court concluded, there was not an implied private right of action 
for damages under § 38-08-06.4.287 
Vogel also argued that the Environmental Law Enforcement Act 
(“ELEA”) of 1975¾N.D. Cent. Code § 32-40-02¾provided her with a 
private right of action to enforce § 38-08-06.4, and, as such, the district 
court had erred in dismissing her claim.288 
The ELEA provides a private right of action for persons aggrieved by 
alleged violations of state environmental statutes: 
[A]ny person . . . aggrieved by the violation of any environmental 
statute, rule, or regulation of this state may bring an action in the 
appropriate district court, either to enforce such statute, rule, or 
regulation, or to recover any damages that have occurred as a 
result of the violation, or for both such enforcement and damages. 
Such action may be brought against any person, state agency, or 
county, city, township, or other political subdivision allegedly 
engaged in such violation.289 
An environmental statute is “any statute . . . for the protection of the 
air, water, and other natural resources, including land, minerals, and 
wildlife, from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”290  Vogel argued that 
§ 38-08-06.4 was an environmental statute as defined by the ELEA.291  The 
Court agreed given that oil and gas are generally classified as minerals.292  
But the Court continued: 
 
283.  Id. ¶ 12. 
284.  Vogel, ¶ 14, 879 N.W.2d at 477. 
285.  Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. 
286.  Id. ¶ 21, 879 N.W.2d at 479. 
287.  Id. 
288.  Id. ¶ 22, 879 N.W.2d at 480. 
289.  Id. ¶ 23 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–40–06 (2016)). 
290.  Vogel, ¶ 24, 879 N.W.2d at 480 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–40–03(2) (2016)). 
291.  Id. 
292.  Id. 
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Although the ELEA may provide a private right of action for a 
violation of 38–08–06.4, any remedies the ELEA provides are 
cumulative and do not replace statutory or common law 
remedies. . . . If a party is allowed to bring a judicial action for a 
violation of 38–08–06.4 before they pursue the administrative 
remedies provided by the statute, the ELEA will replace the 
statutory remedy.293 
Because the statute provided an administrative remedy for the royalty 
owner to pursue in the case of a violation, the Court stated “that remedy 
must be pursued before pursuing a private action as an ‘aggrieved person’ 
under the ELEA.”294  The ELEA was available as a remedy only if the 
Industrial Commission failed or refused to act.295  The Court also held that 
the remedy provided in § 38-08-06.4 replaced common law claims for 
royalties on flared gas.296 
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a concurring opinion.297  He agreed 
with the majority’s “analysis of whether or not a statute requires exhaustion 
of administrative remedies and whether or not it creates a private cause of 
action,”298 but expressed concern that the decision will be cited as the basis 
for the position that § 38–08–06.4 is the exclusive remedy for lessors.299 
Justice Kapsner dissented.300  She noted that the majority 
acknowledged that § 32-40-06 both authorizes a person aggrieved by the 
violation of an environmental statute to bring an action in district court, and 
that § 38-08-06.4 is an environmental statute as defined by the ELEA.301  
“However,” she wrote, “the majority’s holding eviscerates the ELEA by 
requiring an aggrieved person to first exhaust administrative remedies 
before bringing an action under the ELEA.”302  Justice Kapsner viewed this 
requirement as contrary to the plain language of the statute, which stated 
that the remedies provided by the chapter are to be cumulative and shall not 
replace statutory or common law remedies.303  A cumulative remedy, she 
noted, is “[a] remedy available to a party in addition to another remedy that 
 
293.  Id. ¶ 25, 879 N.W.2d at 481. 
294.  Id. ¶ 28, 879 N.W.2d at 481-82 (emphasis added). 
295.  Id. 
296.  Vogel, ¶ 34, 879 N.W.2d at 483. 
297.  Id. ¶ 44, 879 N.W.2d at 485. 
298.  Id. ¶ 45. 
299.  Id. ¶ 50, 879 N.W.2d at 486. 
300.  Id. ¶ 51. 
301.  Id. ¶ 53. 
302.  Vogel, ¶ 53, 879 N.W.2d at 486. 
303.  Id. 
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still remains in force.”304  Justice Kapsner also noted that the Court has held 
that cumulative remedies “are not identical and neither the pursuit of one of 


































304.  Id. ¶ 65, 879 N.W.2d at 489 (emphasis added). 
305.  Id. at 489-90. 
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FAMILY LAW – DIVORCE – EARNING CAPACITY 
Stock v. Stock 
 
In Stock v. Stock,306 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s judgment awarding the wife permanent spousal support of 
$3,000 per month until the husband’s child support obligation ended, at 
which time, the award would increase to $5,500 per month.307 
Robert Stock (“Robert”), the husband, appealed the district court’s 
judgment, arguing that the district court’s award of permanent support, and 
the amount of support awarded, were clearly erroneous.308 
Spousal support awards are findings of fact, which are not to be set 
aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.309  The Court noted the clearly 
erroneous standard it follows:  
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an 
erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or 
if, after a review of the entire record, [the Supreme Court is] left 
with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.310 
Though the Court expressed a preference for rehabilitative support over 
permanent support, it noted that when there is a substantial disparity 
between the spouses’ incomes, it may be appropriate to award indefinite 
permanent support to “maintain the disadvantaged spouse.”311  The Court 
stated that this may be true even where a spouse is capable of 
rehabilitation.312  Thus, the Court concluded that Robert’s argument was 
misplaced where he claimed that the permanent support award was clearly 
erroneous, because Tiffany Stock (“Tiffany”) was young, healthy, and 
capable of rehabilitation.313  In determining whether spousal support is 
appropriate, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the parties.314  Although a spouse’s youth, health, and 
capability for rehabilitation favor rehabilitative support, the Court noted 
that such factors do not preclude a permanent support award.315  The Court 
 
306.  2016 ND 1, 873 N.W.2d 38. 
307.  Id. ¶ 1, 873 N.W.2d at 41. 
308.  Id. ¶ 8, 873 N.W.2d at 42. 
309.  Id. at 42-43. 
310.  Id. (citing Krueger v. Krueger, 2008 ND 90, ¶ 7, 748 N.W.2d 671). 
311.  Id. ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d at 43 (citing Fox v. Fox, 1999 ND 68, 592 N.W.2d 541). 
312.  Stock, ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d at 43 (citing Riehl v. Riehl, 1999 ND 107, ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d 
10). 
313.  Id. ¶ 11. 
314.  Id. 
315.  Id. 
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reasoned that Tiffany had foregone employment prospects throughout the 
marriage to advance Robert’s legal career by moving multiple times and 
caring for their children, resulting in a disparity of earning capacity.316 
The Court also concluded that the amount of support awarded by the 
district court was not clearly erroneous.317  In determining an appropriate 
support award, a court considers both the financial needs of the spouse 
seeking support and the ability of the other spouse to provide for such 
needs.318  “An award amount is clearly erroneous where the amount unduly 
burdens the payor spouse by leaving the spouse in a nearly impossible 
financial position.”319  The Court was unpersuaded by Robert’s argument 
that he is unable to pay the support.320 
The Court reasoned that although the husband’s child support and 
spousal support obligations exceeded his salaried pre-tax base pay, he could 
rely on his year-end bonus to cover the difference between his expenses and 
base pay.321 Further, if his legal practice were to suffer making it difficult to 
pay the amount, he could ask a court to modify the support.322 Therefore, 
the Court concluded that Robert was able to pay the spousal support.  
Justice Sandstrom dissented, stating that under the clearly erroneous 
standard he had “a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made 
here”; he urged that the “spousal support lottery . . . be addressed 
structurally by timely legislation.”323  He noted that the result in the case – 
Robert and Tiffany “yoked together,” with Robert given the duty to pay 
spousal support for three times the length of the marriage, a payout of more 
than $2.5 million324 – could have been different had the parties had a 
different judge, or the same judge on a different day.325  He advocated a 





316.  Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 873 N.W.2d at 43-44. 
317.  Id. ¶19, 873 N.W.2d at 46. 
318.  Stock, ¶ 18, 873 N.W.2d at 45. 
319.  Id. 
320.  Id. ¶ 19, 873 N.W.2d at 46. 
321.  Id. at 43. 
322.  Id. 
323.  Id. ¶ 43, 873 N.W.2d at 50 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
324.  Stock, ¶ 35, 873 N.W.2d at 49. 
325.  Id. ¶ 37. 
326.  Id. ¶ 43, 873 N.W.2d at 50. 
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INSURANCE LAW – POLICY PROVISION DEFINITIONS 
Nodak Mutual Insurance Company v. Koller 
 
In Nodak Mutual Insurance Company v. Koller,327 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment.328  The Court found 
that because Chase Koller (“Koller”) was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s 
household at the time of the accident, only the lower “step-down” policy 
limits of an automobile insurance policy were available in defense of a 
wrongful death lawsuit that resulted from a fatal accident involving 
Koller.329 
When Koller allegedly lost control of an all-terrain vehicle, he and his 
girlfriend, Stephanie Nelson, were killed.330  The registered owner of the 
vehicle was Becky Anderson, Koller’s mother.331  Nodak Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Nodak”) issued the policy that covered the vehicle under the 
named insured, Todd Anderson, Koller’s stepfather.332  The policy provided 
up to $100,000 per incident for a “family member” of the proposed 
insured.333  The policy defined a “family member” as “a person related to 
you by blood, marriage or adoption, including a ward or foster child, who is 
a resident of your household.”334  The “step-down” provision reduced the 
policy limits to $25,000 if the vehicle was driven by an insured who was 
not a “family member” of the named insured.335 
Koller moved out of the Anderson’s household in 2003, was not listed 
as a dependent on their tax returns since 2002, and was dropped as an 
authorized driver on Todd Anderson’s Nodak automobile insurance policy 
in 2005.336  In 2006, Koller moved to Grand Forks, North Dakota, where he 
intermittently lived and maintained a residence until the date of his death.337  
At the time of his death, Koller temporarily lived with his mother and 
stepfather, Becky and Todd Anderson at their home and worked in Griggs 
County.338  According to testimony, Koller was in a serious relationship 
 
327.  2016 ND 43, 876 N.W.2d 451. 
328.  Id. ¶ 1, 876 N.W.2d at 452. 
329.  Id. 
330.  Id. ¶ 2 
331.  Id. 
332.  Id. 
333.  Koller, ¶ 2, 876 N.W.2d at 452. 
334.  Id. 
335.  Id. 
336.  Id. ¶ 3. 
337.  Id. at 453. 
338.  Id. ¶ 5. 
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with Stephanie Nelson and intended to move to Devils Lake to live with her 
at the end of the summer of 2011.339 
Following the fatal accident, Becky Anderson, represented by an 
attorney hired by Nodak, prepared probate documents in Griggs County, 
because Koller was living and working in this county at the time of his 
death.340  The district court determined Griggs County was the proper venue 
for probate.341 
Seeking a declaration for liability of only the reduced step-down policy 
limits because Koller was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s household, 
and, therefore not a family member of the insured, Nodak sued Becky 
Anderson in her capacity as Personal Representative to the Estate of Chase 
Koller, and Chris Kemp (“Kemp”), as guardian of C.K., and the heirs of 
Stephanie Nelson.342 
Kemp filed an answer, cross-claim, and a third-party complaint 
asserting wrongful death against Becky Anderson in her capacity as the 
Personal Representative of Koller’s Estate.343  Kemp, claiming the family 
car doctrine, also asserted negligent entrustment against Todd and Becky 
Anderson individually.344  Pursuant to North Dakota Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 21, the district court severed the wrongful death action from 
Nodak’s declaratory action.345 
When Kemp moved for summary judgment in the declaratory action, 
the district court granted his motion, determining Koller was a resident of 
the Andersons’ household.346  However, the district court vacated its order 
in Kemp’s favor and scheduled a bench trial to assess the issue of whether 
Koller was a resident of Todd Anderson’s household by applying the 
factors articulated in Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bahr-Renner.347 
In Bahr-Renner, the North Dakota Supreme Court articulated the 
following factors to determine whether an individual is a resident of a 
named insured’s household: (1) the intent of the parties; (2) the formality of 
the relationship; (3) permanence or transient nature; and (4) the age and 
self-sufficiency of the party in question.348  District courts are not required 
 
339.  Koller, ¶ 5, 876 N.W.2d at 453. 
340.  Id. ¶ 6. 
341.  Id. 
342.  Id. ¶ 7. 
343.  Id. 
344.  Id.; see Close v. Ebertz, 1998 ND 167, 583 N.W.2d 794. 
345.  Koller, ¶ 7, 876 N.W.2d at 453. 
346.  Id. 
347.  Id. ¶ 8, 876 N.W.2d at 454. 
348.  Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bahr-Renner, 2014 ND 39, 842 N.W.2d 912 (2014); Koller, ¶ 
11, 876 N.W.2d at 454-55. 
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to make a determination under each of these nonexclusive factors, rather 
they are to consider the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case 
basis.349  After considering the Bahr-Renner factors, the district court 
reversed its previous judgment, ruled in favor of Nodak, and found that 
Koller was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s household.350  Unless the 
district court’s decision that Koller was not a resident of Todd Anderson’s 
household is clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court must 
affirm its decision.351 
Kemp contested the district court’s findings regarding each of the 
factors, even when the court weighed a factor in his favor.352  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court analyzed Kemp’s arguments by factor, yet affirmed 
each of the district court’s findings.353 
First, Kemp unsuccessfully argued that the district court failed to 
consider all relevant evidence of intent regarding the “intent of the 
parties.”354  Specifically, the court did not recognize that because Koller 
expressed plans to abandon his Grand Forks apartment, he was, therefore, a 
resident of the Todd Anderson household.355 
The district court determined that the Andersons and Koller were not a 
family living together as defined in the policy for several reasons, including 
the testimony of Todd and Becky Anderson stating their belief that Koller’s 
stay was temporary, while he worked at a nearby resort for the summer.356  
According to the record, after the summer, Koller planned to move to 
Devils Lake with serious girlfriend, Stephanie Nelson.357  Job Service 
records show Nelson searched, presumably on behalf of Koller, for 
construction jobs in Devils Lake, where the two planned to live together 
temporarily with Nelson’s mother.358 
The court also considered Becky Anderson’s testimony stating that 
Koller left his furnishings and numerous personal effects in Grand Forks 
and did not have a key to the Andersons’ house.359  The North Dakota 
 
349.  Koller, ¶ 12, 876 N.W.2d at 455. 
350.  Id. ¶ 13. 
351.  Id. (citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6): “Findings of fact . . . whether based on oral or other 
evidence must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility”). 
352.  Id. ¶¶ 14-33, 876 N.W.2d. at 455-59. 
353.  Id. 
354.  Id. ¶ 14, 876 N.W.2d at 455. 
355.  Koller, ¶ 14, 876 N.W.2d at 455. 
356.  Id. ¶ 15. 
357.  Id. 
358.  Id. 
359.  Id. ¶ 17, 876 N.W.2d at 456. 
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Supreme Court determined that “any intent by Koller to abandon the Grand 
Forks residence in favor of a possible move to Devils Lake was a future 
event not associated with making the Anderson home his residence” so the 
district court’s intent of the parties’ finding was not clearly erroneous.360 
Next, Kemp challenged the district court’s decision regarding the 
“formality of the relationship” factor even though it found Becky 
Anderson’s relationship with Koller “could not be more formal, mother-
son.”361  Specifically, Kemp argued the court failed to consider Koller’s 
relationship with Todd Anderson and the Andersons’ relationship with 
A.K., their grandchild.362  However, the formality of the relationship 
analysis is between the “person in question” and the “other members of the 
named insured’s household.”363  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court invalidated Kemp’s argument, reasoning that even if the district court 
failed to mention these ancillary relationships, the omission was 
insignificant because the district court found in Kemp’s favor.364 
Kemp also disagreed with the district court’s conclusion regarding the 
“permanence or transient nature” factor, saying the court gave it undue 
weight by failing to make a determination regarding “the existence of 
another place of lodging” factor.365  Kemp claimed the totality of the 
circumstances supports a conclusion that, at the time of his death, Koller 
was a resident of Todd Anderson’s household.366 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding 
that Koller’s stay in the Anderson’s home was of a “transient” nature and 
“solely the result of Koller’s loss of employment in Grand Forks.”367  The 
Court again cited several pertinent factors in verifying the district court’s 
assessment, including the probate venue affidavit signed by Becky 
Anderson, Koller’s serious relationship with Stephanie Nelson and planned 
move to Devils Lake to be with her, the fact that Koller was fully 
emancipated and not financially reliant upon his mother and stepfather, and 
the June 12, 2005, removal of Koller as a driver on Todd Anderson’s 
insurance policy.368 
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When it failed to make a determination regarding the “existence of 
another place of lodging” factor, Kemp argued that the district court 
erred.369  Furthermore, Kemp argued that the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding this factor also supports a conclusion that Koller was a resident 
of the Todd Anderson household.370  The Supreme Court acknowledged 
that while the district court did not make an express determination 
regarding another place of lodging, its decision was not clearly erroneous 
because it made findings relevant to the factor.371  These relevant findings 
again include Becky Anderson’s signed probate venue affidavit, and the 
facts that Koller did not take any furniture to the Anderson household, that 
Koller still continued to receive mail at his Grand Forks residence, and that 
Koller’s North Dakota driver’s license, death certificate, and obituaries 
listed his address as his Grand Forks residence.372 
Kemp argued the district court erred in its decision regarding the “age 
and self-sufficiency” factor.373  The North Dakota Supreme Court again 
verified that the district court’s finding that Koller was self-sufficient was 
not clearly erroneous.374  The Supreme Court found ample evidence in the 
record that supported the district court’s finding, including the fact that 
Koller moved out of the Anderson home when he was eighteen, finished his 
education, joined the military, moved to Grand Forks, and had custody of 
his child.375  The Court explained that “[w]hile Koller clearly benefitted by 
having a rent-free place to stay for himself and his child, it does not 
necessarily equate to a lack of self-sufficiency.”376 
Finally, Kemp argued the district court erred when it failed to establish 
Koller’s residency, as a matter of law, in Griggs County, where his estate 
was probated.377  The North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated that 
“technical notions of legal residence and domicile are not controlling.”378  
The Court continued by explaining that even if the district court did factor 
the probate venue into its assessment, this fact is not determinative, as a 
matter of law.379  Therefore, the district court did not err by failing to 
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conclude that Koller was not an Anderson household resident, simply 
because his estate was probated in Griggs County.380 
The North Dakota Supreme Court articulated that, while it may not 
have drawn the same conclusions under de novo review, the clearly 
erroneous standard applicable in this case precluded the Court from 
reweighing evidence.381  Having reviewed the entire record and analyzing 
the application of the Bahr-Renner factors, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court concluded that the district court’s finding that Koller was not a 
resident of Todd Anderson’s household for purposes of the policy were not 
clearly erroneous.382  The North Dakota Supreme Court also concluded that 
the district court did not err when ruling that the lower “step-down” 
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